North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 32
Number 1 Volume 32, Number 1

Article 6

10-1-2009

Equal Opportunities Do Not Always Equate to
Equal Representation: How Bartlett v. Strickland is
a Regression in the Face of the Ongoing Civil
Rights Movement
Brandon Roseman

Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Election Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Roseman, Brandon (2009) "Equal Opportunities Do Not Always Equate to Equal Representation: How Bartlett v. Strickland is a
Regression in the Face of the Ongoing Civil Rights Movement," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol32/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.

Roseman: Equal Opportunities Do Not Always Equate to Equal Representation:

EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES DO NOT ALWAYS EQUATE
YO EQUAL REPRESENTATION: HOW BARTLETT V.
STRICKLAND IS A REGRESSION IN THE FACE OF
THE ONGOING CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
BRANDON ROSEMAN*

INTRODUCTION

The Voting Rights Act of 19651 ("V.R.A.") was established in an
effort to guarantee minorities their right to have adequate representation in government.2 The Constitution guarantees a republican form
of government. However, equal representation and the right to vote
are not always synonymous.' The United States Supreme Court's
("Supreme Court") recent decision in Bartlett v. Strickland changes
the prior interpretation of § 2 of the V.R.A., by clarifying and limiting
the threshold test previously established in Gingles v. Thornburg.4
Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court had not applied Gingles to
mechanically foreclose § 2 protection to minority crossover and influence districts who asserted claims of dilution.5 The Bartlett decision
changes the law in two ways.6 First, it interpreted and established a
rigid 50% population threshold test for minority communities who
seek to bring a claim of vote dilution under § 2 of the V.R.A. 7 Second, since the state-official defendants used § 2 as a defense, the holding effectively changes North Carolina ("N.C.") law.8 The holding
prohibits the N.C. legislature from drawing districts in a manner that
* B.A. University of North Carolina, College of Political Science, 2006, cum laude; J.D.
(cand.) North Carolina Central School of Law, 2010. 1 would like to thank the Law Review and
its members for the opportunity and the assistance that they provided in the creation of this
casenote. This note is dedicated to my family, without whose love, guidance and support my
academic success would not have been possible.
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
2. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2, 120 Stat. 577, 577 (2006).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S.Ct. 1231 (2009) (limiting protection to minorities in certain voting districts).
4. Bartlett, 129 S.Ct. 1231; see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
5. See Voinovich v,Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (where the Court refused to dismiss a § 2
case, acknowledging that impermissible vote dilution could occur in a voting district where the
minority population was not the majority).
6. Bartlett, 129 S.Ct. 1231.
7. Id. at 1246.
8. Id. at 1231.
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would allow minorities from surrounding district areas to collectively
vote to elect a candidate of their choice.9
In effect, the Bartlett decision means that minorities in voting districts, where their prospective population constitutes less than 50% of
the total population, are not entitled to protection under the V.R.A.
as a minority opportunity district.1" The Supreme Court also affirmed
that the V.R.A. does not require states to create or maintain non majority-minority crossover or influence districts when drawing voting
districts.1 Prior to this case, the N.C. General Assembly ("Assembly") had drawn House District 18 in a manner which incorporated
minority populations from the surrounding area.12 This redistricting
was done in an effort to protect minorities' potential to elect a candidate of their choice. 13
This note focuses on the practical effect the holding of Bartlett will
have with regard to three main topics. First, it examines the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Thornburg v. Gingles and § 2, which requires
a rigid 50% minority threshold test before a minority populations' dilution claim will be heard. 4 The 50% rule is controversial because it
limits the protections afforded to minority populations that constitute
less than 50% of their respective districts.1 5 Second, this note discusses the effect of the court's holding, that § 2 does not require the
16
creation or protection of minority crossover and influence districts.
Third, this note hypothesizes the specific implications that this decision may have with regard to N.C. law.' The decision in Bartlett inhibits the protections granted to minorities by the Constitution and
the V.R.A.' 8 The Court should have modified the Gingles threshold
requirements and interpreted § 2 to protect minority voting strength
in crossover and influence districts.1 9
THE CASE

In 1991, the Assembly drew House District 18 to include segments
of four surrounding counties.2" The Assembly drew House District 18
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1239.
Id.
Id. at 1246. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1250-53.
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1249-50.
See generally Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1253-62 (explicating implications of the ruling in

Bartlett).

18. See Bartlett, 129 S.Ct. at 1249-50.
19. Id. at 1249.
20. Id. at 1239.
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with the purpose of creating a district with a majority African American voting age population to satisfy the requirements of § 2.21 This
multi-county district plan was thought to be mandated by § 2, because
at the time, African Americans constituted more than 50% of the
population in the district.22 In 2003, the Assembly created a new districting plan,23 a point when the African American voting age population in House District 18 had fallen below 50%.24
Faced with an inability to draw a geographically compact majorityminority district, the Assembly decided to split up portions of Pender
and New Hanover counties and join them in House District 18.25 The
result was that House District 18 had a minority voting age population
of 39.36% .26 The Assembly stated that it drew House District 18 in an
effort to allow the minority population voters to have the potential to
elect a candidate of their choice.27 The Assembly asserted that had
they not violated the N.C. Constitution and drawn a district that incorporated areas from outside counties, they would have been in violation of § 2, having diluted the minority group's voting strength. 28
In May 2004, Pender County and the five members of its Board of
Commissioners filed suit in state court.2 9 They claimed that the 2003
redistricting of Pender County into two separate house districts violated the "whole county provision" of the N.C. Constitution.3" The
state-official defendants asserted § 2 of the V.R.A. as a defense,
claiming that they were required to create House District 18 as a
crossover district. 31 Pursuant to using § 2 as a defense, the state-official defendants had the burden of proving that a § 2 violation would
have occurred absent the construction of House District 18.32
The trial court concluded that House District 18 constituted a "de
facto" majority-minority district, even though the minority population
did not constitute a majority of the voting age population in the
area. 33 This was due to the fact that African American voters could
get enough crossover white majority votes to elect the African Americans' preferred candidate. 4 The trial court also held that the African
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
See id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1240.
Id.

Id.
ld.
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American population in House District 18 satisfied Gingles' politically
cohesive requirement." The plaintiffs stipulated that the white majority in the area votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable them to usually
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.3 6 The court then determined, that based on the totality of the circumstances, the three Gingles' threshold requirements had been established and that the state
officials were justified in splitting Pender County into two separate
house districts.3 7
On appeal, the N.C. Supreme Court reversed, holding that a minority group must constitute a numerical majority of the voting age population before § 2 can be said to have required the creation of a
majority-minority district.38 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and affirmed the N.C. Supreme Court's decision.3 9 The Supreme
Court ruled that in order for a minority population to assert a § 2
claim, the minority population must constitute a numerical 50% majority of the voting district.40 The Supreme Court also found that § 2
does not require the creation of crossover districts to protect minority
influence in districts where the minority accounts for less than 50% of
the voting age population.4 1 The Supreme Court's rationale expressed
a deference to ideals of equality, a desire to adhere to precedent,
and
42
the need for workable standards in hearing § 2 dilution claims.
BACKGROUND

The V.R.A. was passed by Congress in an effort to protect minority
voting rights under the U.S. Constitution. 43 The primary issue in Bartlett is the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 2 of the V.R.A. of
1965.44 The Supreme Court first interpreted the application of § 2 in
Thornburgv. Gingles.45 In Gingles, the plaintiffs were African American voters in N.C. who asserted a voting strength dilution claim under
§ 2.46 The nature of their claim was that the legislature had drawn the
voting district in a manner that artificially diluted their voting strength
by splitting up a geographically concentrated area of African Ameri35. Id.
36. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1240 (the third Gingles requirement illustrates "[tihat the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to allow the white majority votes usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate." (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986))).
37. Id.
38. See Pender County v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 649 S.E.2d 364 (2007).
39. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1240.
40. Id. at 1245.
41. Id. at 1248.
42. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
43. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
44. See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231.
45. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986).
46. Id. at 35-38.
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can voters into surrounding white majority districts.4 7 The Supreme
Court held that in order for a minority population to assert a § 2 claim
for voting strength dilution, the claimant had to meet three threshold
requirements:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district... Second, the minority group must be able to
show that it is politically cohesive... Third, the minority must be able
to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it-in the absence of special circumstances . . . to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate.4 8
Only the first Gingles requirement is at issue in this case.49
The Supreme Court affirmed the necessity of meeting the Gingles
requirements in Johnson v. Degandy, where the court ruled that all
three Gingles requirements must be satisfied before they will consider
whether a V.R.A. violation has occurred. 5" Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court reserved the possibility that the Gingles majority-minority precondition could be interpreted to include situations where the minority population was not a numerical majority, but had predictable
crossover support that made them influential in the district. 5'
Prior to the Bartlett decision, the Supreme Court had not established what would constitute a sufficiently large majority.52 In Growe
v. Emison, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that vote dilution could be proven by a reduction in the minority population's influence, as opposed to their ability to elect the candidate of their
choice.5 3 The Supreme Court stated that, "when a plaintiff alleges
that a voting practice or procedure impairs a minority's ability to influence, rather than alter, election results, a showing of geographical
compactness of a minority group not sufficiently large to constitute a
majority will suffice." 54
47. Id. at 46.
48. Id. at 50-51.
49. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1241-42 (2009).
50. Johnson v. Degandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013-14 (1994) (explaining that all three Gingles
requirements must be satisfied before the proportionality inquiry or the "totality of the circumstances test" will be applied, however suggesting that the "totality of the circumstances test"
could be used to supersede the Gingles requirements, which are not to be applied in a rigid
fashion that ignores the nature of the injury).
51. Id. at 1008-09.
52. See id.; see also Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) (allowing a § 2 claim to go forward
when the minority population asserting the claim did not exceed 50 percent of the voting age
population).
53. Growe, 507 U.S. at 41.
54. Id. (citing Gingles v. Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48 n.12 (1986)).
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Previous cases also shed light on what types of districts will be protected and the nature of protection guaranteed by § 2. 55 In Voinovich
v. Quilter, the Court held that § 2 can require states to create majority-minority districts, where the minority population would otherwise
be large enough to ensure that they will be able to elect a candidate of
their choice.5 6 Notwithstanding Voinovich, in League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry, the Supreme Court held that minority influence districts were not required to be created by § 2. The purpose
of creating crossover and influence districts is to protect minority voting influence in areas where the minority population is substantial, yet
not enough to elect a candidate without votes from the white majority
population.58
Bartlett is noteworthy not only because of the decisions' impact with
regard to national election law, but also because of its interaction with
the N.C. Constitution. In relevant part, the N.C. Constitution provides: "No county shall be divided in the formation of a senate district."59 Summarily, the N.C. Constitution requires that when voting
districts are drawn, counties are not divided, meaning that each
county must be divided in to voting districts where each district is entirely contained within that county's boarders.6"
ANALYSIS

The practical effect of the Bartlett decision is to remove a layer of
protection that minority populations once had, which made it more
difficult for racially biased voting district schemes to be used.6" Bartlett interprets the first Gingles requirement to mean that in order for a
minority population to assert a claim based on a § 2 violation of vote
dilution, they must constitute a numerical majority of the voting age
population by 50 % or more.62 In doing so, the Supreme Court has
essentially created a new threshold requirement that is "ill suited to its
own administrative ends." 63
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court felt that it needed to
create a bright line rule that would allow them to weed out frivolous
55. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993), League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
56. Vonovioch, 507 U.S. at 154.
57. Perry, 548 U.S. at 443 (allowing a §2 claim to proceed, even though the Latino population did not exceed 50 percent, and holding that under a totality of the circumstances, voting
strength dilution had occurred).
58. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 485.
59. N.C. CONsT. art. II § 3, cl. 3.
60. Id.
61. Pender County v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 493, 649 S.E.2d 364, 366 (2007).
62. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1242 (2009).
63. Id. at 1262 (Breyer J., dissenting).
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claims.' The 50 % rule is efficient for this task, but it seems to place
an insurmountable burden on a large segment of the minority population.6 5 Almost by definition of being a minority, there will be few areas in which a minority segment of a predominantly white population
will constitute a numerical majority of the voting age population in a
district.66
The Court's enforcement of a rigid 50% threshold will mean that
minorities in existing influence and crossover districts "will have no
right to claim relief under § 2 from a statewide districting scheme that
dilutes minority voting rights," an effect that is "flatly at odds with the
obvious purpose of the Act."67 The inability of these populations to
bring claims may in turn have the effect of emboldening state legislatures to be careless in their compliance with the V.R.A. when drawing
voting districts. As a result, many minority citizens may go effectively
unrepresented. If the Court's re-interpretation of § 2 and the Gingles
requirements were analyzed under the guise of § 5,68 we would clearly
see that this decision is a retrogression and conflicts with the purpose
of the Act.
The Supreme Court's determination that 50% of the voting age
population must be a minority is a too high of a standard. Better
threshold tests are available. Johnson held that all that is needed is a
majority-minority based on "the minority's rough proportion of the
relevant population."69 The Supreme Court could possibly still adhere
to the Gingles framework if the "relevant population" was interpreted
to mean those who are likely to vote, not the total population.7" Also,
the Supreme Court could look to the historical demographic data of
voter turn-out in the area, just as the Supreme Court does for finding
majority bloc voting, and create a more realistic assessment of when
the minority voting population would constitute a working majority.71
64. Id. at 1237.
65. Id. at 1248.
66. Id. at 1240.
67. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1250 (Souter J., dissenting).
68. 42 U.S.C. 1973(c) (2006) (section 5 applies to certain states where proposed changes in
the election laws must be submitted for review and approved to ensure compliance with the
Voting Rights Act. The proposed voting practice is measured against the existing voting practice
to determine whether retrogression would result from the proposed change); see also Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883-4 (1994) (finding that unlike a § 5 inquiry retrogression is not the inquiry
in § 2 dilution cases; there is no benchmark to determine if an existing voting practice is dilutive
under § 2).
69. De Grandy v. Johnson, 512 U.S. 997, 1027-1028 (1994).
70. Id. at 1008.
71. See e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30, 55-56 (1986), League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006), Johnson 512 U.S. 997 (the court applies the factors for
determining majority bloc voting, to reach the holding in each of these cases).
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At the heart of the matter is the Supreme Court's disregard for the
protection of minority influence in the electoral process. The Bartlett
holding does not further Congress's goal in enacting the V.R.A.7 2 The
Supreme Court should have used Bartlett to clarify and modify Gingles, by holding § 2 to require the creation and protection of minority
crossover and influence districts.73 Certainly, the V.R.A. should not
be interpreted to guarantee outcomes. Minority populations should
not be given more influence than their representative population
would otherwise call for. However, the one person one vote and equal
voting opportunity arguments enunciated in Bartlett do not take into
consideration equal representation on a societal scale." The Bartlett
court noted that "[t]reating dilution as a remediable harm recognizes
that § 2 protects not merely the right of minority voters to put ballots
in a box, but to claim a fair number of districts in which their votes can
be effective." 75 The V.R.A. should be interpreted to accomplish its
underlying purpose, which is to protect minority influence in voting
districts.7 6 By protecting minority influence we ensure that minorities
are sufficiently represented in government, regardless of which candidate wins the election.
In its rationale the Supreme Court suggests that all minority populations are adequately protected because their decision does not apply
to situations where the dilution is intentional.7 7 While this is easily
accomplished in a hypothetical, the realities of proving such an occurrence are much more difficult. The law needs to take a proactive
stance, where legislatures must realize in advance the potential repercussions of their decisions.78 The intentional dilution catch all, does
not address the fact that the Bartlett decision removes protection for
existing influence and crossover districts.7 9 In order for government
to be conducted race neutrally, we must constantly in fuse race awareness in such decisions to ensure equality and fairness.
The trial court understood the spirit of the V.R.A. and the importance of protecting a working majority when it ruled that House District 18 was a "de facto majority-minority" district.8° Protecting
72. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 109-246, §2, 120 Stat. at 577 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).
73. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248.
74. Id. at 1240-45.
75. Id. at 1251 (Souter J., dissenting, articulating that the protections afforded by § 2 are to
not only ensure the right to vote, but to ensure the vote is effective, reiterating concerns articulated in Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1237.
78. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 109-246, §2, 120 Stat. at 577.
79. Bartlett, 129 S.Ct. at 1253 (Souter J., dissenting).
80. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1235.
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crossover and influence districts, accomplishes the goal of the V.R.A.
by facilitating interracial co-operation in voting. 8a However, contrary
to ideology of the V.R.A., the Supreme Court held that § 2 does not
require states to create crossover or influence districts.8 2 By foreclosing on the possibility that a crossover or influence district falls under
the protection of § 2, the Supreme Court has limited the ability of a
minority population to assert a claim, even when there has been a
clear incidence of voting strength dilution. The Supreme Court should
have interpreted § 2 to require both the creation and protection of
crossover districts, to ensure that minority interests in the community
are represented through their ability to influence elections. The 50%
threshold requirement will have the practical effect of denying minority populations protection from voting strength dilution only when
there is a blatant and intentional violation of the V.R.A.
In Bartlett, the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 2 takes on
unique significance due to the fact that the defendants asserted § 2 as
a defense; claiming that it required them to create a crossover district
to protect minority voting influence from dilution.83 As a result of this
ruling, states will no longer have to be mindful of the implications of
the districts that they draw, except where minorities currently constitute a majority of the population. This ruling could undermine the
purpose of the V.R.A. all together and leave the vast majority of minorities in districts where they will have insignificant influence and no
means to reach a remedy.
The holding of this case has a unique interaction with N.C. law because of the "whole county provision."' The Supreme Court's interpretation of § 2, coupled with the "whole county provision" now
effectively prevents the state legislature from exercising its discretion
to create crossover and influence districts.8" Part of the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's rationale was that their interpretation of § 2
allowed states to comply with the V.R.A. in their own way and did not
require or prohibit them from drawing influence or crossover
districts.86
81. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
82. Bartlett, 129 S.Ct. at 1249.
83. Id. at 1239.
84. NC. CONST. art. II § 3 cl.
3.
85. Bartlett, 129 S.Ct. at 1248.
86. Id.; see Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S.480-483 (explaining that "§2 allows States to
choose their own method of complying with the Voting Rights Act, and we have said that may
include drawing crossover districts"). Cf.Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480 (in explaining how states may
comport with the requirements of §2 and maximize a minority population's electoral success,
when appropriate, "a State may choose to create either a certain number of "safe" districts in
which it is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice or a
greater number of districts in which it is likely, although perhaps not quite as likely as under the
benchmark plan, that minority voters will be able to elect their candidates.").
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However, as a result of Bartlett, the state legislature cannot claim
that § 2 requires the creation of crossover districts and therefore, can
the Supremacy Clause to supersede the
no longer use Federal law and
"whole county provision."8 7 The inability of the state legislature to
draw districts based on the geographical location and concentration of
minorities could have a devastating effect on adequate representation
for minorities in N.C. government. As such, the Assembly should take
the initiative in amending the N.C. Constitution and continue its practice of drawing districts in a manner that adequately protects and apportions minority influence.
The written guarantee of the V.R.A.88 and the Fourteenth8 9 and Fifteenth 90 amendments is the right to vote, however this is only the modus operandi of achieving the underlying guarantee of the
Constitution, which is the right to representation in government. 91
The Supreme Court does not seem to address the fact that influence is
just as important to true representation as the ability to elect one's
candidate of choice. In determining compliance with the V.R.A. the
Georgia v. Ashcroft court noted the importance of determining:
the extent to which a new plan changes the minority group's opportunity to participate in the political process a court must examine
whether the plan adds or subtracts "influence districts" where minora candidate of choice but can play a
ity voters may not be able to elect
92
substantial, if not decisive, role.
In other words, if a representative is elected, and has no need to be
attentive to the needs of an entire segment of their constituency, then
the effect is as if that segment had not been allowed to vote at all. In
short, the Supreme Court's opinion seems to be narrowly set in an
outcome determinative viewpoint, when it is the protection of the political process that is at issue.
CONCLUSION

The Bartlett decision is a retrogression in the face of the civil rights
movement and should not be followed in N.C. The current rationale
behind the interpretation of § 2 and the Gingles requirements fail to
take into consideration the various and complex situations in which
voting strength dilution may occur. The Supreme Court's decision has
87. Id. at 1239; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (explaining that "[i]t is common ground that state election-law requirements like the Whole County Provision may be superseded by federal law").
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
90. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4 cl. 1.
92. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 463.
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an effect that is at odds with the goals of the legislation that it interprets. By not protecting crossover and influence districts, this decision
allows for the possibility that minority voting influence may be disproportionately diluted, with no available recourse. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court should have interpreted § 2 to protect
proportionate minority influence, in accordance with the spirit of the
Constitution and the legislative intent of the V.R.A.
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